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The normative goals of the 1938 Federal Rules facilitated a reconceptualization 
of federal adjudication by welcoming into court a diverse array of persons who, as 
the century unfolded and equality mandates expanded, became rights-holders. As a 
consequence, courts came to serve as venues for democratic debates about rights and 
remedies. Seventy-five years later, that egalitarian project has contracted, and the 
Federal Rules have been refocused on management and judge-based settlement efforts. 
That privatizing of process inside courts, as well as the devolution to agencies 
and outsourcing to private providers, is promoted by official voices within the 
federal judiciary. These new procedural forms close off public access by siting dispute 
resolution outside the public sphere. Not only are potential claimants losing 
knowledge of alleged injuries and the modes of redress, but these privatizing 
procedures undermine rationales for public and private investments in the lower 
federal courts. In 1995, the federal judiciary’s Long Range Plan worried about the 
nightmare of ever-expanding filings and vanishing trials. By 2014, data on filings 
and investments showed flattening rates of filing, reductions in courthouse space, 
and tightening budgets. While the Long Range Plan’s aspirations to control growth 
may be coming to fruition, the planners’ hopes of preserving the federal courts as 
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lively venues, hospitable to diverse claimants trying cases, are not being fulfilled. 
Absent changes in rules, doctrines, and practices, the federal courts—like the 1938 
Federal Rules—are moving into a decline and, with them, opportunities for public 
debates about the contours of legal norms.  
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I. EQUAL JUSTICE, CIRCA 1938, AND THEN, THEREAFTER 
“Drink to our Rules—they know of no flaw:  
‘Equal Justice Under the Law!’” 
         –George Wharton Pepper, circa 19381 
In 1938, George Wharton Pepper, a former U.S. senator and member of 
the committee that drafted the Federal Rules, provided these closing lines 
in one of his “toasts” to the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 Reading 
his words in 2014, it is possible to miss that the idea of “equal justice under 
law” was then innovative. In 1938, those words did not (as they do now) 
appear in scores of state and federal opinions.  
Rather, the phrase “Equal Justice Under Law” had been newly minted in 
1935 to grace the top of the front façade of the Supreme Court’s new 
 
1 A Toast to the Federal Rules (Circa 1938), Symposium, The 50th Anniversary of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 1938-1988, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1877, 1877 (1989).  
2 See Order, 297 U.S. 731 (1936). Pepper also served as the Committee’s vice-chair. See 
Charles E. Clark, Philadelphia Lawyer: An Autobiography, 54 YALE L.J. 172, 173 (1944) (book review). 
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courthouse.3 The architects suggested the words to fit the space allotted above 
the pillars in the Court’s first building of its own. Etched on the other side are 
the words “Justice the Guardian of Liberty,”4 which captured the constitutional 
jurisprudence of the era, as “liberty”—of contract and from regulation—was its 
leitmotif. Indeed, at the 1932 ceremony laying the cornerstone, Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes called the new building “a testimonial to an imperisha-
ble ideal of liberty under law” and made no mention of equality.5 
Yet today “Equal Justice Under Law” is the “tag line” for the U.S. Su-
preme Court, which uses it on the cover of brochures.6 The linkages between 
the Supreme Court’s iconic marble temple and equality under law were forged 
in the decades that followed, through Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 and 
Reed v. Reed in 1971, intersecting with landmark federal laws protecting equal 
rights in accommodations, credit, housing, salaries, and employment, supply-
ing lawyers by way of the Legal Services Corporation, mandating fee-shifting 
for victorious civil rights claimants, and thereby equipping individuals with 
resources to pursue rights in courts.  
The toast by Pepper in 1938 predates these renovations of American law. 
Yet the normative goals that infused the 1938 Federal Rules facilitated this 
reconceptualization of federal adjudication by welcoming into court a 
diverse array of persons, who became rights-holders as the century unfold-
ed. Many scholars have chronicled the underpinnings of the 1938 Rules—
with their functionalist, anti-formalist commitments to easing barriers to 
entry through trans-substantive, uniform, national provisions that expanded 
opportunities for information exchange, vested discretion in trial judges, 
and aimed for efficient decisionmaking focused on the merits of claims.7  
The equality goals of the 1930s rested in part on the trans-substantivity 
of the Rules, cutting across an eclectic expanse of civil proceedings and 
 
3 See Judith Resnik & Dennis Curtis, Inventing Democratic Courts: The New and Iconic Supreme 
Court, 38 J. SUPREME CT. HIST. 207, 232-33 (2013) [hereinafter Resnik & Curtis, Inventing 
Democratic Courts]. 
4 See id. at 233. 
5 Charles Evans Hughes, Corner Stone of New Home of Supreme Court of the United States Is 
Laid, 18 A.B.A. J. 723, 729 (1932).  
6 See Resnik & Curtis, Inventing Democratic Courts, supra note 3, at 233 and at 250 n.135. 
7 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1127-
65 (1982); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: 
Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286 (2013); Judith Resnik, 
Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 494-98, 502-15 (1986); 
David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA L. 
REV. 1969, 1972-77 (1989); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987). 
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assuming the fungibility of litigants. All kinds of cases were subject to the 
same regime. Further, to the extent that any rule worked to the advantage of 
a “plaintiff” or a “defendant,” that advantage would be neutralized over time 
as, in some cases, a given person or entity would be a plaintiff and in other 
cases, a defendant—shaping a sense of a new neutral system, resulting in 
“equal justice under law.”  
For several decades, the 1938 Rules rested on their laurels. In 1963, 
Charles Clark, who had been the 1938 reporter, celebrated his project as he 
sought to deflect efforts to remove the Supreme Court from its role in 
rulemaking; Clark argued the system had worked. The Rules, “professionally 
conceived and professionally executed,” had permeated “the daily profes-
sional life of all lawyers” and garnered no “criticism of major character.”8  
But criticisms have emerged as the progressive aspirations for simplicity, 
uniformity, and predictability met the challenges generated by new technolo-
gies, transformations in the legal profession, the constitutional and statutory 
innovations sketched above, and conflicts over norms that the Rules both 
represent and have engendered. The 1938 Federal Rules came into being not 
only in the era of segregation but also of mimeographing. Decades away 
were processes such as photocopying, computing, electronic data storage, 
and 3D printing, along with employment discrimination class actions, mass 
tort aggregation, same-sex marriage litigation, and thousand-person law firms.  
Yet Clark and his colleagues reshaped ideas about what federal courts 
and judges do, how state courts organize their procedures, the ways in which 
the law is taught and lawyers practice, and who can be litigants. Federal 
judges gained their shared identity as a national cohort with the same daily 
practices.  
For litigants, the 1938 Rules were redistributive, providing diverse sets 
of claimants with access to courts. Clark wrote his hortatory praise when a 
committee, chartered by Chief Justice Earl Warren, was reviewing the 
Rules. Benjamin Kaplan, a Harvard Law School professor, was its reporter, 
assisted by Arthur Miller.9 Their committee is known for its focus on multi-
party litigation and for its signature accomplishment, the revision of Rule 
23, governing class actions. The revised Rules paved the way for groups—
tenants, consumers, employees, recipients of benefits, school children, and 
prisoners—to come to federal court.  
 
8 Charles E. Clark, The Role of the Supreme Court in Federal Rule-Making, 46 J. AM. JUDICATURE 
SOC’Y 250, 254 (1963).  
9 See Announcement of the Chief Justice of the United States, Committees on Rules Prac-
tice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (April 4, 1960), reprinted in 
28 U.S.C.A. at xvii (West 1960); Arthur R. Miller, In Memoriam: Benjamin Kaplan, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 1354, 1356 (2011).  
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The now-national shorthand of the (b)(2) class worked in tandem with 
the civil rights revolution, for it was expressly designed to enable enforce-
ment of school desegregation decrees.10 The (b)(3) class brought—as Kaplan 
explained—new remedies for consumers, bundling small-value claims.11 The 
class action rule, intersecting with the judge-promoted multidistrict litigation 
statute and mass tort defendants entering bankruptcy, shifted expectations, 
as various forms of aggregation became the norm for diverse kinds of 
claimants.12  
By redistributing access to courts, the Rules undermined the earlier 
premises of fungible litigants and produced the current understanding that, 
in a substantial number of cases, governments and corporations would be 
defendants, charged by individuals or groups with imposing harms. “Plain-
tiff” and “defendant” became identity-based categories that meant that not 
all would benefit or suffer equally from the impact of civil rules—a point 
that repeat players came to understand well.13  
What the 1938 Federal Rules also gave litigants and the public was access 
to information. The asbestos litigation is a “poster case” of discovery’s 
powers and of the impact of public disclosure on debates about liability for 
harms and the shape of remedies.14 Thus, at the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Federal Rules in 1988, Benjamin Kaplan concluded that the Rules  
have worked to considerable (if not universal) satisfaction to support revo-
lutions of the substantive law. The much criticized discovery function and 
class action remain together the scourge of corporate and governmental male-
factors.15  
 
10 See David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern 
Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 702-08 (2011); Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991) [hereinafter Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation”]. 
11 Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, The Class Action—A Symposium, 10 B.C. INDUS. & 
COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969).  
12  Judith Resnik, Compared to What?: ALI Aggregation and the Shifting Contours of Due Process 
and of Lawyers’ Powers, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628, 656-61 (2011); Resnik, From “Cases” to 
“Litigation,” supra note 10, at 21-24. 
13 See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).  
14 For example, through discovery, lawyers uncovered the “Sumner Simpson papers,” demonstrat-
ing that asbestos manufacturing companies were aware in the 1930s through 1950s of the dangers of 
asbestos but did not inform workers of its dangers to health. See, e.g., Threadgill v. Armstrong 
World Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d 1366, 1372-74 (3d Cir. 1991).  
15 Benjamin Kaplan, A Toast, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1879, 1881 (1989). He added that “funda-
mental faults of litigation procedure—for example, the handicapping of the weak, despite statutory 
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II.  INVESTING IN FEDERAL JUDICIAL POWER  
Congress not only delegated rulemaking power to the judiciary but also 
endowed federal judges with an array of enforcement powers. Between the 
1960s and the 1990s, Congress created hundreds of new federal causes of 
action, thereby inviting investment of private resources—both funded and 
pro bono—for enforcement of or to defend against these new rights. 
Congress added public resources by expanding the Justice Department and 
other federal agencies, chartering more life-tenured judgeships, inventing 
(at the behest of federal judges) the position of magistrate judge, adding 
bankruptcy judges, expanding the numbers of law clerks and other court 
staff, and authorizing the construction of hundreds of new courthouses. 
During much of the twentieth century, the federal courts were a booming 
industry. Two charts and a photograph provide a quick summary. Figure 1 
tracks the growth in filings, from approximately 30,000 cases brought yearly 
in 1901 to more than 300,000 filed in 2001. Figure 2 maps the rise in life-
tenured judgeships, from around 100 authorized judgeships in 1901 to more 
than 850 life-tenured positions in 2001.  
 
  
 
help for them here and there—should be attributed not to the Rules, but rather to the state of the 
nation . . . .” Id.  
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Figure 1: Federal District Court Filings: 1901, 1950, 200116 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Federal Court Article III Judgeships: 1901, 1950, 200117 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 This figure is derived from multiple sources. Data for 2001 are from ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2001  tbls.C & D (2001). Data for 
1950 are from David S. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal District 
Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 126 tbl.14 (1981) (citing ADMIN. OFFICE 
OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE 
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1950)). Data for 1901 are from id. at 103 tbl.6 (citing 1 AM. 
LAW INST., A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 107 (1934); 2 AM. LAW 
INST., A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 111 (1934)) and are estimated. 
Numbers do not include bankruptcy filings.  
17 Data are derived from ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDGES AND JUDGESHIPS: 
AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS (2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/ 
docs/all-judgeships.pdf; see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, CHRONOLOGICAL 
HISTORY OF AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/docs/history-district-judgeships.pdf.  
              Total:    37,007                        92,342                        317,996
1901                        1950                        2001
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Another way to see the changes is through understanding the history of 
courthouse construction and by looking at courthouse buildings. In the mid-
1930s, the first federal skyscraper courthouse (designed, as was the Supreme 
Court, by Cass Gilbert) opened in New York City.18 The verticality of the 
twentieth-century charts, tracking filings and judgeships, is matched by the 
Thomas F. Eagleton United States Courthouse in St. Louis, Missouri 
(shown in Figure 3) which, when it opened in 2000, was the largest federal 
courthouse in the country.19  
 
Figure 3: Thomas F. Eagleton United States Courthouse,  
St. Louis, Missouri20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photographer: The Honorable David D. Noce 
 
18 See Resnik & Curtis, Inventing Democratic Courts, supra note 3, at 231-35. 
19 U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., THOMAS F. EAGLETON UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE, ST. 
LOUIS, MISSOURI 12 (2001). 
20 Architects: Hellmuth, Obata + Kassabaum, Inc., 2000. Photograph courtesy of and repro-
duced with the permission of the photographer, the Honorable David D. Noce, U.S. Magistrate 
Judge, Eastern District of Missouri.  
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The federal judiciary’s administrative girth likewise expanded. In 1939, 
Congress ended the Department of Justice’s role in providing administrative 
assistance to the federal judiciary and substituted a new entity, the Adminis-
trative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO), operating inside the judicial 
branch.21 While the AO once camped in the Supreme Court’s basement, the 
construction of the Thurgood Marshall Federal Building in Washington, 
D.C. in 1992 provided dedicated space.22 The facility is shared by the 
Federal Judicial Center (FJC), chartered in 1968 to train judges through 
socializing them to the mores of the Rules and through research, including 
on the Rules’ impact.23 By 2006, some 30,000 people worked for the federal 
judiciary.24  
While the jurisprudence of William Rehnquist is not associated with an 
expansive view of federal court jurisdiction, the expansion of the federal 
judiciary’s footprint took place during his tenure as Chief Justice; Congress 
invested more than eight billion dollars in courthouse buildings.25 In the 
mid-twentieth century, the policymakers of the courts—the U.S. Judicial 
Conference—had sought more “court quarters”; by century’s end, many 
federal judges sat in new courthouses, including some in buildings designed 
by architects such as Henry Cobb, Thom Mayne, Richard Meier, and Moshe 
Safdie.26 The more than 500 segregated, purpose-built facilities that exist 
today make it hard to remember that, in 1850, no federal building had the 
name “U.S. Courthouse” on its front door.27  
 
21 Pub. L. No. 76-299, 53 Stat. 1223, 1223 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 601 (2012)). 
22 See generally Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building, ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL, 
http://www.aoc.gov/capitol-buildings/thurgood-marshall-federal-judiciary-building (last visited May 
12, 2014). 
23 See, e.g., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES (6th 
ed. 2013), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Benchbook-US-District-Judges-6TH-FJC-MAR-
2013-Public.pdf/$file/Benchbook-US-District-Judges-6TH-FJC-MAR-2013-Public.pdf. 
24 See New Director of the Administrative Office Named, THIRD BRANCH NEWS (May 2006), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/TheThirdBranch/06-05-01/New_Director_of_the_Administrative_ 
Office_Named.aspx. 
25 See Judith Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary (Literally and Legally): The Monuments of 
Chief Justices Taft, Warren, and Rehnquist, 87 IND. L.J. 823, 895 (2012) [hereinafter Resnik, Building 
the Federal Judiciary].  
26 See JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, 
CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 147, 168, 
175 fig.118 (2011).  
27 See Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary, supra note 25, at 861, n.127; RESNIK & CURTIS, 
REPRESENTING JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 140-42. 
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III.  RECONCEPTUALIZING THE “JUDICIAL,” REWRITING THE RULES, 
AND RE-SITING ADJUDICATION: THE NEW PRIVATE PROCESS 
But those grand buildings may soon be obsolete. The norms for judges 
have changed, as have the hopes for what happens in courts. Through an 
amendment process now dominated by federal judges, the Federal Rules 
have come to insist on a charter for judges different than what the 1938 
Rules had provided. Today’s Rules instruct judges to promote alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR). Some of these procedures are court-based yet 
private. Other forms of ADR are the devolution of adjudication to adminis-
trative agencies and the outsourcing of decisions to private ADR providers. 
These three changes constitute what should be understood as a “New 
Private Process,” displacing the model proffered in the 1938 Federal Rules. 
These practices are often justified as enhancing “access” for rights-
holders by improving opportunities to bring claims less expensively and 
more expeditiously. One issue, not explored here, is the empirical question 
of whether either ADR methods or court-based lawsuits succeed in enhancing 
claimants’ access to remedies. My focus in this Article is on how these 
practices affect another form of “access”—the public’s opportunities to have 
firsthand knowledge of the claims brought, the interactions among dispu-
tants, and the decisions made.  
“All courts shall be open” are words regularly found in state constitu-
tions.28 The federal Constitution protects rights to “public” trials for 
criminal defendants,29 as well as for treason,30 and public access to civil 
litigation derives from a mix of common law traditions, jury trial rights, the 
First Amendment, and the Due Process Clause. Yet as detailed below, the 
rise of judge-based settlement efforts, of devolution to agencies, and of 
outsourcing to private providers—wholeheartedly promoted by official 
voices of the federal judiciary—closes off public access by siting dispute 
resolution outside the public sphere. Not only are potential claimants losing 
knowledge of alleged injuries and the modes of redress, but these new forms 
of dispute resolution undermine rationales for public and private investments 
in the lower federal courts. 
 
28 See Judith Resnik, Constitutional Entitlements to and in Courts: Remedial Rights in an Age of 
Egalitarianism: The Childress Lecture, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 917 app. 1 at 999-1003 (2012) [hereinafter 
Resnik, Constitutional Entitlements]. 
 29 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial . . . .”). 
30 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (“No person shall be convicted of Treason unless on 
the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.”). 
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A.  The Settling, Managing, Multitasking Judge 
The 1938 Rules shaped what Rule 16 called “Pre-Trial Procedure;  
Formulating Issues,”31 vesting discretion in judges to confer with lawyers on 
trial preparation, that is, amending pleadings, the “possibility of obtaining 
admissions . . . [to] avoid unnecessary proof,” limiting expert witnesses, 
and such “other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.”32 Fifty-
five years later, the “pretrial” lost its hyphen and shifted its focus.33 The 
discretionary possibility of a conference has become increasingly obligatory, 
as judges are extolled to use their managerial authority.34 Today, Rule 16 is 
the centerpiece of judicial management of both lawyers and of cases, and 
the aim is avowedly to promote settlement without trial.  
The concept of settlement was not foreign in the 1930s. Yet the 1938 
Rules neither used the term “settlement” nor tasked judges with its promotion. 
Federal Rule 68 did provide for an “offer of judgment”35 and the Rules 
prohibited class actions from being “dismissed or compromised without the 
approval of the court.”36 In contrast, the current version of the Federal 
Rules uses the word “settlement” in the texts of Rules 11,37 16, 23,38 and 26.39  
The evolution of Rule 16 both reflected and produced changing norms 
about the judicial role. In the middle of the twentieth century, a group of 
judges sought to school newly-appointed judges to be “early convert[s] to 
 
31  FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (1938). The 1938 Federal Rules can be found at 308 U.S. 645 et seq. (1938). 
32 FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (1938). 
33 See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 936 (2000) [hereinafter Resnik, Trial as Error]. 
34 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b) (amended 1993); see, e.g., Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosen-
thal, The Reappearing Judge, 61 KAN. L. REV. 849, 850-51 (2013); Robert F. Peckham, The Federal 
Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. 
REV. 770 (1981); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 399-402 (1982). 
35 See FED. R. CIV. P. 68 (1938). 
36 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (1938). 
37 The current Rule 11 provides that monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court’s 
initiative unless the court “issued [its] show-cause order . . . before voluntary dismissal or 
settlement of the claims made by or against the party that is, or whose attorneys are, to be 
sanctioned.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(5)(B). Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1938). 
38 The 1938 version, “Class Actions,” prohibited dismissal or compromise without court approval. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (1938). The 2003 Rule added a new subsection, “Settlement, Voluntary 
Dismissal, or Compromise,” detailing the courts’ role. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
39 In 1970, the word “settlement” was used to explain that parties could obtain discovery of 
insurance policies. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to the 1970 amendments. 
The 1993 amendments require parties before scheduling conferences to “disclose, without awaiting 
formal discovery requests, certain basic information that is needed to . . . make an informed 
decision about settlement.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) advisory committee’s note to the 1993 
amendments. 
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pre-trial” management.40 Initially responding to “protracted” cases,41 judges 
crafted special procedures for control, which migrated from the “big case” 
to a broader spectrum of the docket.42 Yet judges debated the propriety of 
raising the question of settlement, as some argued that settlement could be a 
“by-product” of pretrial conferences but ought not to be an objective of 
judges convening those conferences.43  
By the 1980s, the Rules had enlisted judges in the pursuit of settlement. 
The 1983 amendments committed judges to the managerial model; the 
revisers argued that it had “become commonplace to discuss settlement at 
pretrial conferences.”44 A Rule 16 conference was no longer “focused solely 
on the trial”; instead, Rule 16 made “case management an express goal of 
pretrial procedure,”45 and one purpose was that “settlement should be 
facilitated at as early a stage of the litigation as possible.”46 At “any confer-
ence under this rule . . . [participants were to] consider . . . the possibility 
of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute”; 
“extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute”47 were explained to be 
“adjudicatory techniques outside the courthouse.”48  
A decade later, those “extrajudicial procedures” officially moved inside 
the courthouse. The 1993 amendments detailed more of the work and power 
of the managerial judge, authorized to direct “a party or its representative” 
to “be present or reasonably available by telephone in order to consider 
possible settlement of the dispute.”49 No activities were described as 
“extrajudicial”; instead “special procedures”50 were those which aimed to 
“assist in resolving the dispute.”51  
Even if a case cannot immediately be settled, the judge and attorneys can 
explore possible use of alternative procedures such as mini-trials, summary 
 
40 See Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 33, at 945, n.72. 
41 Id. at 938-43. 
42 Id. 
43 See id. at 947-48. 
44 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(7) advisory committee’s note to the 1983 amendments. 
45 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a) advisory committee’s note to the 1983 amendments. 
46 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a) (1983).  
47 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(7) (1983). 
48 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(7) advisory committee’s note to the 1983 amendments. In 1988, 
Kaplan raised concerns that revisions were “engaging [ judges] . . . in pursuit of settlement and 
other shortcuts . . . [and] encourag[ing] the modification of judges’ sanctified patterns of behavior 
and thought, with consequences hard to foresee or appreciate.” Kaplan, A Toast, supra note 15, at 
1880-81; see also Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 34, at 377-78.  
49 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c) (1993). 
50 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(9) (1993). 
51 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(9) advisory committee’s note to the 1993 amendments. 
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jury trials, mediation, neutral evaluation, and nonbinding arbitration that 
can lead to the consensual resolution of the dispute without a full trial on 
the merits.52 
Further, instead of the 1983 notes cautioning judges against imposing 
“settlement negotiations on unwilling litigants,”53 the 1993 Rule 16 gave 
judges power to compel participation.54 Congress also supported this shift in 
judicial role through enactment in 1990 of the Civil Justice Reform Act, 
prompting in part the 1993 amendments.55  
Rule 16 has not produced an extensive body of law, but several of the 
reported cases come from litigants protesting judicial insistence on ADR or 
the sanctions judges imposed on litigants reluctant to use ADR.56 Judicial 
engagement with settlement has spawned other norm shifts, including a 
revised approach to ex parte contact. The Code of Judicial Conduct for 
United States Judges now permits judges to “confer separately with the 
parties and their counsel in an effort to mediate or settle pending matters,” 
while warning that judges “should not act in a manner that coerces any party 
into surrendering the right to have the controversy resolved by the courts.”57  
The denouement of this thirty-year transition can be seen on the federal 
judiciary’s website, reproduced in part in Figure 4; the homepage welcomes 
visitors to “Understanding the Federal Courts” by explaining “How the  
 
 
52 Id.  
53 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(7) advisory committee’s note to the 1983 amendments. 
54 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b) advisory committee’s note to the 1993 amendments. Research 
questions the efficacy of judicial case management, in terms of time and money. See generally 
JAMES S. KAKALIK, TERENCE DUNWORTH, LAURAL A. HILL, DANIEL MCCAFFREY, 
MARIAN OSHIRO, NICHOLAS M. PACE & MARY E. VAIANA, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL 
JUSTICE, JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MAN-
AGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996). 
55 See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. I, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified at 
28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 until it was to sunset on Dec. 1, 1997). That act instructed each district court 
chief judge to appoint advisory committees, charged with developing methods of promoting 
efficient dispute resolution. See also Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
315, 112 Stat. 2993 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651–58 (2012)).  
56 See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Mar. I., 694 F.3d 1051, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 
2012) (holding that the government can be ordered to participate in mandatory settlement 
conferences but that requiring a government official with authority to settle to appear at a first 
settlement conference was an abuse of discretion); Pinero v. Corp. Courts at Miami Lakes, Inc., 
389 F. App’x 886, 888-89 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming, based on an abuse of discretion review, a 
$2500 fine against a plaintiff’s attorney for failing to bring her client to a settlement conference). 
57 See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, Canon 3(A)(4)(d), cmt. 3A(4) 
(2014), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/Vol02A-Ch02.pdf. 
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Federal Courts Work.” One part of the text, set off in a box for emphasis, 
reads:  
To avoid the expense and delay of having a trial, judges encourage the litigants 
to try to reach an agreement resolving their dispute.58  
 
Figure 4: Homepage of the United States Federal Courts59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.  Devolution 
The Federal Rules are the centerpiece of this Symposium, but the norms 
they reflect and produce are part of a larger context, revising adjudication’s 
reach. Below I sketch those links through a brief discussion of the delegation 
of adjudicatory functions to administrative agencies and the outsourcing to 
private entities through the Supreme Court’s expansive reading of the 1925 
 
58 Civil Cases, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/ 
UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/HowCourtsWork/CivilCases.aspx (last visited May 12, 2014).  
59 Id. 
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Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). A few graphics and a brief review of case 
law provide insights into both.  
Figure 5 captures the congressional investments in administrative adju-
dication. As of 2001, about 85060 life-tenured judgeship lines were authorized; 
another 32461 slots went to bankruptcy judges and some 47162 to magistrate 
judges, while about 470063 judges served in federal administrative agencies. 
That same year, some 85,000 evidentiary proceedings—defined to include a 
proceeding in which a person testified but not necessarily at a trial—took 
place in federal courthouses before magistrate and bankruptcy judges as well 
as Article III judges. As Figure 6 details, some 570,000 evidentiary proceedings 
took place in four high-volume federal agencies, dealing with social security, 
veteran, immigration, and employment claimants.64 The Article III judiciary 
has both promoted such delegation65 and by and large found it constitutional, 
as many efforts to limit the jurisdiction of administrative law judges and 
magistrate judges have been rebuffed.66 The Court has, however, limited 
delegation to bankruptcy court judges.67  
  
 
60 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDGES AND JUDGESHIPS: AUTHORIZED 
JUDGESHIPS, supra note 17. 
61 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES 2005 tbl.1.1 
(2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2005/ 
Table101.pdf. 
62 Id. 
63 RAYMOND LIMON, OFFICE OF ADMIN. LAW JUDGES, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
JUDICIARY: THEN AND NOW: A DECADE OF CHANGE 1992-2002 app. C, at 7 (2002). 
64 Cf. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 500 (2004). 
65 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL 
COURTS 33-34 (1995), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/Publications/ 
FederalCourtsLongRangePlan.pdf [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN]. 
66 See, e.g., CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 
(1980); Judith Resnik, “Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice”: Inventing the Federal District Courts of the 
Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607, 626-47 (2002).  
67 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe 
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). The implications of these decisions are the subject of Executive 
Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison, 702 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2880 
(2013). 
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68 Data regarding agency judgeships are derived from LIMON, supra note 63, app. C at 7; see 
also Michael Asimow, The Spreading Umbrella: Extending the APA’s Adjudication Provisions to All 
Evidentiary Hearings Required by Statute, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1003, 1008 (2004). Information 
presented regarding Article III, magistrate, and bankruptcy judgeships comes from ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 61. Versions of Figures 5–7 appeared originally in 
Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1129-35 (2006).  
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C.  Outsourcing 
A third mechanism of privatization comes from the enforcement of con-
tracts mandating arbitration in lieu of adjudication. My own 2002 cell 
phone service document, reproduced in Figure 7, provides an example. By 
activating the service, I waived rights to court and became obligated to 
“arbitrate disputes arising out of or related to this or prior agreements.” In 
purported symmetry, this document also states that both the provider and 
the consumer were precluded from pursuing any “class actions or class 
arbitrations.” Once, such provisions would not have been enforced, but 
today consumers are subject to their strictures. Like revisions of the Federal 
Rules, the law on mandatory arbitration has been built on changing views 
about the role of courts and the value of litigation.  
 
69 Data are derived from ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2001 JUDICIAL BUSI-
NESS 24-25, 30 (2001). Classifying and quantifying the volume of administrative proceedings is 
complex; the methods are detailed in Memorandum from Natalie Ram & Bertrall Ross to author 
( June 6, 2006) (on file with author). 
(approx. 570,000) 
(approx. 85,000) 
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Figure 7: Example of Cellular Phone Document: 2002 
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In 1925, the FAA mandated that a “written provision in any maritime 
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce” 
(unless it was in “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, 
or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce”) 
was “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable”70 subject to “such grounds as exist 
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”71 As those familiar 
with Commerce Clause jurisprudence of that era know, the exclusion was 
directed at the very workers that the federal legislature had the authority to 
regulate.  
The Supreme Court once read the FAA as neither precluding other fed-
eral regulatory goals nor applying when parties had significantly different 
bargaining power. As the Court explained in 1953 in Wilko v. Swan,72 even if 
some buyers and sellers “deal[t] at arm’s length on equal terms,” the federal 
securities laws were “drafted with an eye to the disadvantages under which 
buyers labor.”73 Further, arbitrators’ awards could “be made without expla-
nation of their reasons and without a complete record of their proceedings,” 
and hence, one could not examine “arbitrators’ conception of the legal 
meaning of such statutory requirements as ‘burden of proof,’ ‘reasonable 
care’ or ‘material fact.’”74  
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court revised its views. Rejecting the Wilko 
Court’s concern that arbitration was a “method of weakening the protections 
afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants,”75 the Court 
reread congressional statutes to require that persons having made the 
agreement to arbitrate were obliged to those agreements.76 Further, in 1984, 
in Southland Corp. v. Keating,77 the Court extended the FAA’s application to 
state courts despite the California Franchise Investment Law’s requirement 
of “judicial consideration of claims.”78 Dissenters (including Justice O’Connor 
and Justice Rehnquist) objected that the Court had turned the FAA, a 
federal procedural right irrelevant in state courts, into a “newly discovered 
federal right.”79 In 2001 and thereafter, a five-person majority expanded the 
FAA again by applying it to employees, even though employees had alleged 
 
70 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012). 
71 Id. § 2 (2012). 
72 346 U.S. 427 (1953).  
73 Id. at 435-38. 
74 Id. at 436. 
75 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989).  
76 Id. at 480.  
77 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
78 Id. at 10. 
79 Id. at 22-23 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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they had rights under state antidiscrimination laws and even when waivers 
appeared on job applications.80  
The many decisions, often 5–4, regularly rely on the Court’s view that 
arbitration is to be preferred to adjudication. In 2011, in AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion,81 the Court enforced waivers of class actions in either 
arbitration or the courts through provisions like that accompanying my cell 
phone. The majority, per Justice Scalia, relied on its prior readings of the 
FAA (“our cases”) to support the idea that the FAA not only mandated 
“bilateral” arbitration but also did so to avoid the “costliness and delays of 
litigation.”82 Further, the 2012 decision in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood,83 
describing the “federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,”84 coupled 
with the 2013 ruling in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,85 has 
narrowed the doctrine’s openness to reading other federal statutes to require 
adjudication and to assessing whether alternatives impose prohibitive 
expense or are otherwise inadequate to vindicate federal statutory rights.86  
The Court’s recent interpretation of the FAA shares features central to 
the Court’s new approach to the Federal Rules. First, like Bell Atlantic Corp. 
v. Twombly87 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,88 the FAA rulings are laced with discus-
sion of the burdens of adjudication. Second, just as limits on class actions 
such as Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes89 undercut Rule 23’s capacity to 
augment resources for claimants, the FAA case law ignores resource dispari-
ties between parties.90 Third, the flexibility of arbitration that was seen in 
 
80 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 
534 U.S. 279 (2002). The EEOC can, under certain circumstances, pursue claims that the 
employee cannot. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. at 297-98. 
81 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
82 Id. at 1749-50 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
83 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012).  
84 Id. at 669.  
85 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).  
86 A few state courts have held some obligations to arbitrate unenforceable. See, e.g., Gandee v. 
LDL Freedom Enter., Inc., 293 P.3d 1197, 1200-03 (Wash. 2013) (holding a four-sentence arbitration 
agreement unconscionable in three ways). 
87 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
88 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  
89 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
90 Rule 16 managerial judges may be responsive to the lack of parity of resources, as the Rule 
provides a platform for judges committed to engagement and dialogue. See Gensler & Rosenthal, 
supra note 34; William G. Young, A Lament for What Was Once and Yet Can Be, 32 B.C. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 305 (2009). But the Rule neither insists on nor builds in mechanisms for 
oversight, and the 1983 advisory notes recommended exemptions from case management for cases 
likely to involve unrepresented or other needy litigants, such as social security claimants and 
habeas petitioners. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b) advisory committee’s note to the 1983 amendments. 
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the 1950s as a flaw has since become a virtue. Indeed, arbitration and 
adjudication are now posited as variations on the same dispute resolution 
theme—aimed (per the reconfiguration of Rule 16) as a mechanism to settle 
disputes rather than to enforce legal rights.91  
IV.  ENDANGERED SPECIES: TRIAL JUDGES AND PUBLIC PROCESSES 
In 2007, the Honorable Brock Hornby argued that the time had come to 
depict differently what judges did. “Reality TV” ought not show judges on 
the bench but rather 
[i]n an office . . . using a computer . . . to monitor the . . . caseload . . . 
conferring with lawyers (often by telephone or videoconference) . . .  
researching the law . . . and writing . . . . For federal civil cases, the 
black-robed figure up on the bench, presiding publicly over trials and  
instructing juries, has become an endangered species, replaced by a person 
in business attire at an office desk surrounded by electronic assistants.92  
While this “multitasking” judge is gaining appeal in other legal systems as 
well,93 Judge Hornby’s description captures why television—and court civic 
programs—focus on trials. Not much can be gleaned from watching judges 
looking at computers or talking on phones. The new judicial posture is a 
factor contributing in the United States to the now-familiar “vanishing 
trial.”94 In 2012, of one hundred civil cases filed in federal district court, 1.2 
began trial.95 By contrast, cases in which some “court action” takes place 
have increased. Four decades ago, about forty percent of the docket closed 
without “court action”;96 in 2012, about twenty percent of the filings did so.97  
 
91 See generally Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and 
Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211 (1995).  
92 D. Brock Hornby, The Business of the U.S. District Courts, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 453, 462 (2007). 
93 See THE MULTI-TASKING JUDGE: COMPARATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Tania 
Sourdin & Archie Zariski eds., 2013).  
94 See generally Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1255 (2005); Judith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empirical and 
Normative Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 783 (2004). 
95 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 
31, 2012 tbl.C-4 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2012/tables/C05Mar12.pdf.  
96 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1972); see also 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1977, at 185 tbl.309 (1977). 
97 See 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 95, at tbl.C-4.  
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How might one evaluate this shift? John Langbein has argued that the 
vanishing trial is an appropriate denouement of the 1938 procedural innova-
tions, enabling litigants and judges to learn enough that they no longer need 
trials.98 But whether by trial or through other procedures, what is needed for 
democratic governance is public information about disputes, the processes 
that produce their resolutions, and the power (public and private) that 
shapes the mechanisms and outcomes.99 Along with trial judges, public 
knowledge about conflicts, procedures, and resolutions is also endangered. 
The diminution in private and public investments in “law” is one problem. 
Another is the absence of opportunities for direct observation to gain the 
experience necessary to debate what procedure ought to look like and what 
norms ought to govern rights and obligations.  
To glimpse what is at risk of being lost through the New Private Process 
requires understanding what aspects of courts are and could remain accessi-
ble to the public. Given that most “court action” occurs during the pretrial 
phase, and that agencies and ADR are the sites for many disputes, below I 
sketch the contours of the law on access to non-trial processes in courts, in 
the hearings and in the records of agencies, and in private dispute resolution 
centers.  
 The backdrop is the history in England and the United States of open 
courts—traditions that are intertwined with jury trials and with European 
practices of public performances of the power of the state.100 The Funda-
mental Laws of West New Jersey of 1676 provided that “justice may not be 
done in a corner nor in any covert manner.”101 A century later, state consti-
tutions turned these customs into rights. An early example comes from the 
1792 Delaware Constitution, proclaiming “All courts shall be open,” a phrase 
appearing in several other constitutions as well.102  
 
98 John Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 551 (2012). 
99 Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L. 
REV. 631.  
100 See generally RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 26, at 288-305.  
101 CHARTER OR FUNDAMENTAL LAWS, OF WEST NEW JERSEY, AGREED UPON, ch. 
XXIII (1676), reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL CHARTERS, 
AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR 
HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2551 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 
1909), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/nj05.asp. 
102 DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 9, reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTI-
TUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 
278, 279 (Ben: Perley Poore ed., 1877). For citations of other state constitutions with such terms, 
see Resnik, Constitutional Entitlements, supra note 28, at app. 1.  
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The federal Constitution guarantees “public” trials for criminal defendants 
but offers fewer directions for civil proceedings.103 Nonetheless, an amalgam 
of the First Amendment’s Free Speech and Petition Clauses, due process, 
jury trial guarantees, and the common law protects access to civil as well as 
criminal trials. Yet, when what happens in courts changes, questions emerge 
about how presumptions of access apply. In the criminal context, the issues 
are about whether ancillary proceedings—voir dire, pretrial suppression 
hearings, and postconviction proceedings—should, like the “public trials” 
referenced in the Sixth Amendment, be open, as well as about which partici-
pants can enforce rights to openness. For example, the Supreme Court has 
overturned the exclusion of a sole observer from a voir dire104 and has 
recognized access rights of both criminal defendants and the public to 
court-based hearings—as cases with names such as Richmond Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Virginia105 reflect.106  
The Court’s analysis is often framed in two parts: “whether the place 
and process have historically been open to the press and general public,” and 
“whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of 
the particular process in question.”107 This “experience and logic” test, if 
met, requires the state to justify closures based on a showing of a compel-
ling state interest.108 Because this test is contingent rather than rights-based, 
“experience” can change the “logic” of what needs to be open. As the 
Federal Rules and ADR reshape “experiences,” they alter the “logic” of what 
courts are about and when openness is therefore protected.  
In terms of documents, in 1978, when ruling that the public could not 
have the actual tapes made by President Nixon, the Supreme Court de-
scribed a “general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, 
including judicial records and documents.”109 What becomes a “judicial 
record or document” garnering the presumption? Court-generated docket 
sheets are covered,110 and parties’ filings (electronic or paper) may be, but 
 
103 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
104 Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 215-16 (2010) (per curiam). 
105 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
106 See, e.g., id.; Judith Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 405 (1987). 
107 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).  
108 Id. at 9; see also United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 841-42 (3d Cir. 1994). 
109 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns., Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) ( footnote omitted); see also 11 
U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (presuming access for bankruptcy records). 
110 See Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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some courts also test for materials’ relevance to “the performance of the 
judicial function and usefulness in the judicial process.”111  
When the Federal Rules required that discovery materials be filed unless 
a court ordered otherwise,112 that information could make its way into the 
public domain, subject to any protective orders imposed. In 1984, the 
Supreme Court held that a state court’s protective order did not run afoul of 
First Amendment injunctions against prior restraints, as long as the order 
was supported by good cause and did not preclude dissemination of underly-
ing information through other routes.113 Further, the Court commented that 
“pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not public components of a civil 
trial.”114 Thus, to the extent discovery was filed in court, it was subject to 
“the control of the trial court” because no First Amendment right existed 
“to information made available only for purposes of trying [a person’s 
law]suit.”115  
Rule changes reduced discovery’s potential openness. In 2000, Federal 
Rule amendments reversed the prior filing provisions, which were replaced 
by the rule that “discovery requests and responses must not be filed until 
they are used in the proceeding or the court orders filing.”116 The change 
was explained as a ministerial response to volume—that papers (in the pre-
digital age of the 1990s) could not be stored. But even if documents are 
filed, judges may decide to limit access unless the materials are annexed to 
complaints, substantive motions, or otherwise deemed a “judicial docu-
ment.”117 
In addition, parties are permitted to bargain to hide materials un-
earthed. Confidentiality clauses may be a predicate to the initial disclo-
sures—making nondisclosure the baseline from which to negotiate before 
 
111 See United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995) (granting access to reports 
related to consent decree implementation). Redactions of certain filings are possible. See IDT 
Corp. v. eBay, 709 F.3d 1220, 1224 (8th Cir. 2013).  
112 In 1938, Rule 5(d) had provided that discovery materials were to be filed “within a reason-
able time.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d) (1938). In 1980, the Rules continued to require filing, but 
only for discovery materials used in the proceedings or requested by a court order. See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 5(d) & 30( f )(1) (1979); FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d) advisory committee’s note to the 1980 
amendments. The Advisory Committee noted that, while cumbersome to store, such materials 
could be of interest to others, such as similarly situated litigants and the public. FED. R. CIV. P. 
5(d) 1980 advisory committee’s note. 
113 Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36-37 (1984).  
114 Id. at 33; see also id. at 33-34 & n.19.  
115 Id. at 33 & n.19; id. at 32. 
116 See FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d) (2000). 
117 See, e.g., FTC v. AbbVie Products LLC, 713 F.3d 54 (11th Cir. 2013); United States v. 
Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 207-08 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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information can be revealed, including to similarly situated litigants. 
Further, using court-based ADR may also be a method by which materials 
become private. Both state118 and federal119 law recognize privileges for 
information obtained through various forms of ADR.120 This potential for 
sheltering documents has prompted protests, resulting in case law providing 
standards for compelling disclosure.121  
Settlements, if filed in court, are generally accessible.122 Yet some courts 
permit sealing—upheld, for example, in Holocaust art recovery and in 9/11-
related litigation.123 Moreover, stipulations of dismissal need not include 
underlying agreements. A headline-grabbing example of closure came from 
a sex discrimination case filed by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC). The press had heralded an expected trial: “The 
Women of Wall Street Get Their Day in Court.”124 Instead, as The Wall 
Street Journal explained, “[a]lthough the EEOC had planned to introduce 
statistics about women’s pay and promotion at trial, details on the alleged 
disparities . . . were never made public . . . . As part of the settlement, 
the parties agreed to honor a pre-existing confidentiality order, designed to 
keep many . . . documents . . . under wraps.”125  
Class actions, and a few other statutory provisions, have information-forcing 
mechanisms because they require courts to approve settlements and permit 
or require information about proposed settlements to be disseminated. Yet in 
practice, researchers have found that information on distributions to 
 
118 See generally Ellen E. Deason, Procedural Rules for Complementary Systems of Litigation and 
Mediation—Worldwide, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 553, 565-667 (2005). 
119 See 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (2006) (requiring local rulemaking for confidentiality in court-
based ADR). Administrative ADR requires confidentiality absent agreement, prior disclosure, or 
threat to public safety. See 5 U.S.C. § 574(a) (2012).  
120 See Laurie Kratky Doré, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time to Let Some Sun Shine 
in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 495-97 (2006). 
121 See e.g., In re Teligent, Inc., 640 F.3d 53, 58-59 (2d Cir. 2011). 
122 In the Eleventh Circuit, even if “the sealing of the record is an integral part of a negotiated 
settlement . . . the court file must remain accessible to the public.” Brown v. Advantage Eng’g, 
Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1992); see also Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 930 (7th Cir. 
2002); Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 346 (3d 
Cir. 1986). 
123 See, e.g, In re September 11 Litigation (World Trade Center Properties Litigation), 723 F. 
Supp. 2d 526, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Schoeps v. Museum of Modern Art, 603 F. Supp. 2d 673, 676 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
124 See Patrick McGeehan, The Women of Wall Street Get Their Day in Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 
11, 2004 (Sunday Business), at 5.  
125 Kate Kelly & Colleen DeBaise, Morgan Stanley Settles Bias Suit for $54 Million, WALL ST. 
J., July 13, 2004, at A1. 
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individuals has been sparse.126 Moreover, even as an FJC study found that 
most settlements filed in court were not sealed, some of those which were 
sealed had been brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act,127 which has a 
statutory obligation of openness—at least as to some settlements.128 
This system of closure is not inevitable; settlement contracts made under 
the tutelage of courts could—like plea bargains—be subject to regulation. 
The rationales for court intervention include third-party interests, the need 
to supervise lawyer–client relations (akin to Rule 11 guilty pleas), and 
avoiding subsequent disputes because of a lack of understanding or 
specificity of settlements.129 A few local rules, based on such concerns, 
provide models,130 as do some state provisions calling for settlements in 
open court as a predicate to enforcement.131 Some states also require 
Internet postings of settlements over a certain amount, such as in medical 
malpractice cases.132 Yet, despite the many words added to the revised Rule 
16, the Rule does not speak to the public dimensions, if any, of case manage-
ment and ADR, nor does the Rule give guidance on whether and how to 
record whatever settlements it aims to help produce.  
Turning to agency-based adjudication, other provisions address access to 
the documents, proceedings, and outcomes. The parameters are set by a mix 
of statutes and regulations and, episodically, court-generated doctrines. In 
federal administrative proceedings, some adjudicatory proceedings are 
 
126 See Nicolas M. Pace & William B. Rubenstein, How Transparent Are Class Action Out-
comes? (RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, Working Paper No. WR-599-ICJ, 2008). 
127 TIM REAGAN & GEORGE CORT, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SEALED CASES IN FEDERAL 
COURTS 15 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Sealed-
Cases.pdf; ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, MARIE LEARY, 
NATACHA BLAIN, STEVEN S. GENSLER, GEORGE CORT & DEAN MILETICH, FED. JUDICIAL 
CTR., SEALED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT 5 (2004).  
128 See generally Elizabeth Wilkins, Silent Workers, Disappearing Rights: Confidential Settlements 
and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 109 (2013).  
129 See generally Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593 (2005); 
Stephen C. Yeazell, Transparency for Civil Settlements: NASDAQ for Lawsuits? (UCLA Sch. of Law, 
Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 08-15, 2008), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1161343.  
130 See, e.g., Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Secrecy in Litigation: The Healthy Debate Continues, 81 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301, 302 n.3 (2006).  
131 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2104 (McKinney 2012); Gordon v. Shafiq, 968 N.Y.S.2d 352, 354-55 
(Sup. Ct. 2013).  
132 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-17a (2013) (requiring that “[u]pon entry of any medical 
malpractice award or upon entering a settlement of a malpractice claim,” the entity making 
payment must notify the Department of Public Health of the terms of the award); NEB. REV. 
STAT. 84-713(1) (2010) (requiring a public agency to “maintain a public written or electronic 
record of all settled claims”).  
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presumptively open and others closed to outsiders.133 The justifications for 
the closing of files and hearings rely on either individual interests in privacy 
(of health matters and other life circumstances) or—as famously in the 
context of immigration deportation proceedings after 9/11—national 
security.134 
Yet even if one could read files or attend hearings, practical impediments 
make doing so difficult. Most agencies are located in office buildings that 
often do not have open doors. When records in administrative agencies are 
available, they may be on tape or in file cabinets, rather than in digital form. 
Administrative law judges’ decisions are likewise not always provided to the 
public through web portals.135  
The increasing prevalence of closed processes can be seen from a few 
challenges to proceedings that blur the line between “court” and the 
alternatives. In 2011, the Second Circuit considered the limits imposed on 
access to processing by the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA), 
which had become a low-level criminal court. NYCTA issued about 125,000 
notices of violation in a year; some 20,000 citations were contested at in-
person hearings in which Transit Authority officials presided.136 To attend, 
observers needed permission from respondent-defendants. The Second 
Circuit concluded, under the “experience and logic” test, that a “qualified 
First Amendment right of access”137 existed because the Transit Authority’s 
“‘quasi-judicial’ administrative proceedings” were so similar to a “criminal 
trial.”138 
The NYCTA adjudicated high-volume, low-level infractions. Closed pro-
cedures in the Delaware Chancery Court, however, had a different purpose. 
In 2009, the Delaware legislature, worried about maintaining the state’s 
“preeminence” in high-end corporate dispute resolution, created a program 
to attract users.139 The legislature offered what it called “arbitration,” run by 
its Chancery Court’s judges and held in the state’s courthouses, to disputants 
if at least one party was incorporated in Delaware, the stakes were at least a 
 
133 Social security hearings are presumptively open, 20 C.F.R. § 498.215(d) (2013), as are 
some immigration hearings, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27 (2013). Access to veteran proceedings and 
records is limited. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012); 38 U.S.C. § 5701 (2012); 38 U.S.C. § 7332 (2012). 
134 Compare N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), with Detroit 
Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). 
135 Some decisions can be found on the Internet. See, e.g., Civil Remedies ALJ Decisions by 
Year, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/dab/decisions/civildecisions/ 
index.html (last visited May 12, 2014).  
136 See N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 290-91 (2d Cir. 2011). 
137 Id. at 304; see also id. at 298 n.9. 
138 Id. at 299; id. at 299-303. 
139 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. x, §§ 347, 349 (West 2010 Supp.); DEL. CH. R. 96–98 (2014). 
  
2014] The Privatization of Process 1821 
 
 
million dollars, and the disputants were willing to pay $12,000 in filing fees 
and $6000 per day thereafter.140  
Those sums purchased what the district court called “in essence a closed 
civil trial”; filings were not on the public docketing system, and the public 
was barred from attending. The decisions were enforceable as judgments 
and subject to review by the Delaware Supreme Court. A group called the 
“Delaware Coalition for Open Government” argued that the state’s legisla-
tion violated the First Amendment; after a federal district judge agreed, 
Delaware’s Chancery Court judges appealed and lost again. The Third 
Circuit, in a divided ruling, concluded that “Delaware’s government-
sponsored arbitration” could not be held in a courthouse, be decided by state 
judges, produce an enforceable judgment, and yet be closed to the public.141  
But public access is not required when consumers and employees are 
pressed into arbitration under the FAA. Thus, the circuit court rulings 
analyzing why access needs to be accorded by the New York City Transit 
Authority and Delaware’s Chancery Court make all the more salient the 
Supreme Court’s enforcement of mandatory arbitration, which has thus far 
walled off the public more than administrative adjudication and court-based 
activities. As the dissenting circuit judge argued in the Delaware litigation, 
the promise of confidentiality is a linchpin of ADR’s appeal,142 and the rules 
of the leading purveyors of ADR require it.143  
The pages of this Symposium document the losses imposed by closure. 
Information developed in the shadow of constitutional obligations of open 
courts spans disclosures of judges’ salaries, court budgets, filings, trends, case 
proceedings, and outcomes. Thus far, law has not imposed parallel regulations 
on the alternatives it has promoted.144 Private dispute resolvers are left to 
produce information as they wish, subject only to constraints such as  
state-mandated disclosures of malpractice verdicts or other publication 
 
140 See supra note 139.  
141 Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 514 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 1551 (2014). 
142 Id. at 523 (Roth, J., dissenting).  
143 See, e.g., Principle 12, Consumer Due Process Protocol, NAT’L CONSUMER DISPUTES AD-
VISORY COMM., http://www.adr.org/cs/idcplg?IdcService=GET_FILE&dDocName=ADRSTG_ 
005014&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased (last visited May 12, 2014); Rule 31, Rules of 
Conditionally Binding Arbitration, BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU, http://www.bbb.org/council/programs-
services/dispute-handling-and-resolution/dispute-resolution-rules-and-brochures/rules-of-
conditionally-binding-arbitration/#31 (last visited May 12, 2014). But see Pokorny v. Quiztar, Inc., 601 
F.3d 987, 996-1002 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding unenforceable ADR provisions including confidentiality 
that created one-sided advantages).  
144 See Paul R. Verkuil, Privatizing Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 963 (2005).  
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requirements.145 Aside from this patchwork of regulations, corporate disclosure 
statements, academic case studies, and thousands of anecdotes, the public 
face of private dispute resolution depends on what providers decide to put 
on it.146  
V.  NIGHTMARISH SCENARIOS: LONG RANGE, STRATEGIC PLANNING, 
AND PROJECTED CASE FILINGS 
“If the federal courts’ civil and criminal jurisdiction continues to grow at the same 
rate it did over the past 53 years, the picture in 2020 can only be described as 
nightmarish. . . . [I]n twenty-five years the number of civil cases commenced 
annually could reach 1 million . . . , while the criminal filings could reach nearly 
84,000 . . . . [A]ppeals could approach 335,000 . . . .” 
             –Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts, 1995147 
When discussing the twentieth century developments, I provided Fig-
ures 1 and 2, as well as the photograph of the federal courthouse in St. 
Louis, to capture some of the exuberance represented by investments in the 
federal courts; the upward lines suggested a never-ending surge of cases, 
resulting in demands for more judges and bigger courts.148 Rather than 
embrace this picture of growth in a Weberian fashion, leaders of the federal 
courts saw “increasing caseloads” as a problem to be solved.149 The quote 
about “nightmarish” scenarios comes from the report of a special committee 
chartered by the Judicial Conference to write a Long Range Plan during the 
wave of millennium projects of the 1990s. The ninety-three recommenda-
tions, accompanied by two hundred pages of explanation and appendices, 
were adopted by the Judicial Conference in 1995.  
In 2010, the Judicial Conference issued a new Strategic Plan, a slimmed-
down, eighteen-page document officially superseding the Long Range Plan 
without being “an across-the-board rescission of the individual policies 
articulated in the recommendations and implementation strategies” of the 
 
145 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (2014); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW 
§ 14-3903 (LexisNexis 2013). 
146 See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Employment Arbitration: Empirical Findings and Research Needs, 
DISP. RESOL. J., Aug.–Oct. 2009, at 6, 6-7; Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily 
Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and 
Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871 (2008).  
147 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 65, at 18.  
148 See supra note 20 and Figures 1, 2 & 3.  
149 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 65, at 8.  
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1995 Long Range Plan.150 The differences in the two plans, produced fifteen 
years apart, reflect both the success of efforts to circumscribe access to the 
federal courts and the worries that such a contraction produces.  
In 1995, the “nightmarish” scenario for 2020 had assumed a growth rate 
calculated “over the past 53 years” that produced a “bleak” picture of civil 
filings growing from 239,000; by 2020, civil cases “could reach 1 million.”151 
This rising tide would, the planners thought, undermine federal court 
governance and the coherence of law. Moreover, resources would become 
scarcer, causing “delay, congestion, cost, and inefficiency.”152  
Under this scenario, the Long Range Plan predicted that “civil litigants 
who can afford it will opt out of the court system entirely for private 
dispute resolution providers.”153 Further, district court judges were already 
spending “fewer of their working hours in civil trials than ever before,” and 
“the future may make the civil jury trial—and perhaps the civil bench trial 
as well—a creature of the past.”154 The projected denouement was that the 
“federal district courts, rather than being forums where the weak and the 
few have recognized rights that the strong and the many must regard, could 
become an arena for second-class justice.”155 In this future, the “federal 
courts have by and large become criminal courts and forums for those who 
cannot afford private justice.”156  
As explained in the Foreword to the 1995 Long Range Plan, the goals 
were to avoid those predictions and to conserve the “judicial branch’s core 
values of the rule of law, equal justice, judicial independence, national 
courts of limited jurisdiction, excellence, and accountability,” while dealing 
with the challenges presented by the “limited financial resources of the 
federal government.”157 The Long Range Plan cited the Framers’ preference 
for keeping the federal judiciary small (a notion “at the heart of judicial 
 
150  See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FED-
ERAL JUDICIARY 18 (Sept. 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/ 
Publications/StrategicPlan2010.pdf [hereinafter 2010 STRATEGIC PLAN].  
151 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 65, at 18. 
152 Id. at 19. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 19-20. 
155 Id. at 20.  
156 Id. 
157 Id. at vii. 
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federalism”)158 and advocated that the federal judicial workload needed to be 
limited while making courts “more accessible.”159  
Proposed solutions included increasing reliance on administrative agency 
adjudication when constitutionally permissible,160 more judicial case manage-
ment,161 and increased use of alternative dispute resolution methods.162  
Further, the Judicial Conference urged Congress “to exercise restraint”163 by 
not creating new federal statutory rights or crimes unless advancing “clearly 
defined and justified national interests”164 and “where federal interests are 
paramount.”165 The point was to impose “sensible limitations on federal 
criminal and civil jurisdiction.”166 The Long Range Plan also encouraged 
Congress to help states as part of “judicial federalism.”167 The Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure played a small role, discussed in the context of expanding 
judicial case management.168  
The 2010 Strategic Plan had no growth charts or “recommendations” but 
rather goals, issues, and responses—termed “strategies.” In addition to the 
rule of law, equal justice, judicial independence, accountability, and excel-
lence, the judiciary’s goals discussed another value: “service.”169 The 2010 
Strategic Plan began with a discussion of “providing justice,” and the first 
 
158 Id. at 8 (noting that “[f]ederal courts were intended to complement state court systems, 
not supplant them” and “were to be a distinctive judicial forum of limited jurisdiction, performing 
the tasks that state courts, for political or structural reasons, could not”). 
159 Id. at 5. 
160 Id.at 33-34 (“Congress and the agencies concerned should be encouraged to take measures 
to broaden and strengthen the administrative hearing and review process for disputes assigned to 
agency jurisdiction, and to facilitate mediation and resolution of disputes at the agency level.”). 
161 Id. at 70 (“The district courts should enhance efforts to manage cases effectively.”). 
162 Id. at 70-71 (“District courts should be encouraged to make available a variety of alterna-
tive dispute resolution techniques, procedures, and resources to assist in achieving a just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of civil litigation.”). 
163 Id. at 28. 
164 Id. at 23. 
165 Id. at 24. 
166 Id. at 22; see also id. at 24 (Recommendation 2); id. at 28 (Recommendation 6). 
167 Id. at 21-23 (asking Congress to consider providing significant resources to state court 
systems to enhance their capacity to take on greater caseloads). 
168 See id. at 58 (“Rules of practice, procedure, and evidence . . . should be adopted and, as 
needed, revised to promote simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and a just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of litigation.”); id. at 70-71 (encouraging “continued experimenta-
tion in the district courts with innovative case management techniques” and “a variety of 
alternative dispute resolution techniques that involve members of the bar and other court 
adjuncts”). 
169 See 2010 STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 150, at 2. The Plan defined service as “commit-
ment to the faithful discharge of official duties; allegiance to the Constitution and the laws of the 
United States; dedication to meeting the needs of jurors, court users, and the public in a timely 
and effective manner.” Id.  
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answer to enhancing that effort was “[e]ffective case management” to reduce 
cost and delay.170 Other concerns included improving courthouse safety;171 
implementing new technology;172 increasing staff and compensation;173 
expanding the numbers of judgeships;174 attracting applicants;175 raising 
judicial salaries;176 improving relationships with other branches of govern-
ment;177 enhancing public trust, understanding, and confidence;178 and 
managing resources—a phrase that reflected ongoing pressures to downsize 
staff and facilities.179  
Concerns about capacity and resources continue to be recorded when the 
judiciary goes to Congress for judgeships and its budget. In September 
2013, for example, the Chair of the Judicial Conference’s Judicial Resources 
Committee testified in support of more judgeships; he spoke of a thirty-
nine percent increase from 1991 to 2012 in district court filings, resulting in 
some 520 filings per judgeship, each year.180 By 2013’s end, the annual report 
by Chief Justice Roberts was devoted to “the single most important issue 
facing the courts”: the budget.181 
VI.  BACK TO THE FUTURE: FLATTENED FILINGS AS A NORMATIVELY 
RISKY GOAL FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 
Some—but not all—of what the Long Range Plan envisioned has come to 
pass. Figure 8 provides one summary of caseload predictions for 2010 and of 
the numbers of cases actually filed. With the advantage of hindsight, we 
know that, rather than the 610,000 filings that had been anticipated in 1995 
for the year 2010, only 360,000 cases were begun—a number close to the 
322,000 cases filed in 2000. Figure 9 maps case filings over more than a 
 
170 Id. at 4-5.  
171 Id. at 6-7.  
172 Id. at 11-12. 
173 Id. at 9-10. 
174 Id. at 7. 
175 Id. at 10. 
176 Id. at 7. 
177 Id. at 14-16. 
178 Id. at 16-17. 
179 Id. at 8. 
180 Statement of Hon. Timothy M. Tymkovich, Chair, Comm. on Judicial Res. of the Judicial 
Conf. of the U.S., Before the Subcomm. on Bankr. and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
113th Cong. (Sept. 10, 2013), available at http://news.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/judge-
tymkovich-testimony.pdf. 
181 JOHN ROBERTS, 2013 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1 (Dec. 31, 
2013), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2013year-endreport.pdf. 
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century, from 1905 to 2013, explaining the source of an impression of 
unabated growth. The bars on the graph rise over the century. But when the 
focus shifts to the last two decades, 1995–2013, as shown in Figure 10, the 
bars flatten, and filings look relatively stable.182  
 
Figure 8: Projected Versus Actual Federal District Court Filings:  
2000 and 2010 (Forecasts Made in 1995)183 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
182 Another recent analysis, using a somewhat different method of counting cases, also  
concluded that civil filings had been stable since 1986, and argued that rather than describe civil 
caseloads exploding, the term should be “stagnation.” See Patricia Hatamyar Moore, The Civil 
Caseload of the Federal District Courts, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2416864. 
183 This chart is derived from multiple sources. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS: STATUS REPORT, 
at I-18 (2008) (reviewing forecasts made in 1995 against filing figures in 2000); ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 
OF THE DIRECTOR 138 tbl.C, 204 tbl.D (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/ 
JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness2010.aspx (reporting filings in 2010); LONG RANGE PLAN, supra 
note 65, at app. A, tbl.1 (“Caseload and Judgeship Projections”) (showing forecasts for civil and 
criminal filings in district court for 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, and 2020). 
Total:          364,800               322,262                                         610,800               361,323 
      2000                2000                                        2010                 2010 
    Forecast             Actual                                     Forecast              Actual 
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Figure 9: All Cases Commenced in Federal District Courts: 1905–2013184 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
184 The information presented in Figures 9, 10, 11, and 12 is based on multiple sources. Data 
for 1905–1998 are from William F. Shughart & Gökhan R. Karahan, Determinants of Case Growth in 
Federal District Courts in the United States, 1904–2002 (ICPSR 3987), INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM 
FOR POLITICAL & SOC. RESEARCH, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/3987 
(last updated Mar. 30, 2006). For data for years 1999–2012, see FED. JUDICIAL CTR., HISTORICAL 
CASELOADS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, http://www.fjc.gov/history/caseload.nsf/page/ 
caseloads_main_page (last visited May 12, 2014). Data for 2013 are taken from ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2013 tbls.C & D 
(2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/caseload- 
statistics-2013.aspx. The data do not include bankruptcy filings.   
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Figure 10: Civil and Criminal Cases Commenced in  
Federal District Courts: 1995–2013185 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These recent numbers raise questions about the rate at which filings in-
creased, and Figure 11 captures the rate and fluctuations of federal filings for 
the century. Figure 12, the growth rate from 1975 to 2013, shows that if the 
trend line that appears for these years continues, it is likely that both the 
rate of filings and the number of civil and criminal cases may decline.186 
Figure 13 separately charts bankruptcy petitions, which account for the 
largest volume of filings.  
  
 
185 See id. 
186 Here, I do not disaggregate civil and criminal cases. Cf. Theodore Eisenberg, Four Decades 
of Federal Civil Rights Litigation (Nov. 14, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2354386. Further, I do not disaggregate by 
type of civil case. Cf. Moore, supra note 182.  
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Figure 11: Growth Rate and Fluctuation of Total  
Federal District Court Filings: 1905–2013187 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Growth Rate of Federal District Court Filings: 1975–2013188 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
187 See supra note 184. The effective annual growth rate described in Figures 11, 12, and 13 
reflects the annual rate of growth that would have occurred if filings had increased at a constant 
rate during the prior five years. This growth rate, based on actual growth in each of the five years, 
has been smoothed out to avoid the distraction of the volatility in year-to-year growth rates. Five-
year growth rates for 1905–1908 are based in part upon estimated filings during 1900–1903, 
projected backwards using years with reported numbers of filings and cases pending. Data do not 
include bankruptcy filings. 
188 See id. Data do not include bankruptcy filings. In Figures 12, 13, 14, and 17, the summary 
line is a simple linear regression, also known as an ordinary least squares regression, that best fits 
the growth rates during the years charted.  
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Figure 13: Growth Rate of Bankruptcy Filings: 1984–2013189 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, the aspirations of the 1995 Judicial Conference to slow filing rates 
are coming to fruition. Yet the slowdown has not achieved the planners’ 
other goals. As Figure 14 documents, while federal courts continue to garner 
significant investments from Congress, the rate of growth in funding is 
declining. Indeed, the federal judiciary has committed itself to shrinking its 
own footprint. In a 2013 press release, the courts announced that “space 
reduction is priority Number One for the Space and Facilities Committee,”190 
and the Chief Justice reported that staffing, in 2013, was at the lowest level 
since 1997.191 
 
 
189 Data for 1979–2012 are reported by FED. JUDICIAL CTR., HISTORICAL CASELOADS IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS, http://www.fjc.gov/history/caseload.nsf/page/caseloads_main_page (last visited 
May 12, 2014). Data for 2013 are taken from ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, BANKRUPTCY 
STATISTICS 2013 tbl.F (2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/Bankruptcy 
Statistics/BankruptcyFilings/2013/1213_f.pdf. 
190 31 Court Facilities to be Downsized in First Year of Cost-Cutting Project, ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS (Oct. 15, 2013) (quoting Hon. D. Brooks Smith, Chair, Jud. Conf. Space & 
Facilities Comm.), http://news.uscourts.gov/31-court-facilities-be-downsized-first-year-cost-cutting-
project (last visited May 12, 2014). 
191 ROBERTS, supra note 181, at 5. 
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Figure 14: Government Expenditures for the Federal Judiciary: 1980–2013192 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 15 details estimated revenues from filing fees in 2012. The 
estimates show that Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitioners provided some $250 
million in revenue, while civil filing fees accounted for about $100 million. 
This chart echoes another concern of the 1995 Judicial Conference: that the 
federal courts would become places for poor people and criminal defend-
ants, rather than attract a mix of investments from a diverse set of litigants. 
The 1995 Long Range Plan urged reliance on state courts, which, as shown in 
Figure 16, continue to receive the vast bulk of cases. Even as juvenile, 
domestic, and traffic filings are excluded, forty million cases were filed in 
state courts in 2010.193 Figure 17 completes the graphic discussion by 
showing that the rate of filings in state courts is more stable than that in the 
federal courts. 
 
192 The information presented in Figure 14 comes from OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2015 HISTORICAL TABLES tbl.4.1 (2014), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2015/assets/hist.pdf; BUREAU 
OF ECON. ANALYSIS, 2009 GDP CHAINED PRICE DEFLATOR, available at http://www.bea.gov/ 
national/xls/gdplev.xls. 
193 See ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN, RICHARD Y. SCHAUFFLER, SHAUNA M. STRICKLAND, 
SARAH A. GIBSON & ASHLEY N. MASON, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE 
WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2009 STATE COURT CASELOADS 3 (2011).  
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Figure 15: Estimated Filing-Fee Income from Civil and  
Bankruptcy Cases in 2012194 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
194 The information in Figure 15 comes from ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2013 tbl.F-2 (2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2013/0313_f2.pdf; JOHN ROBERTS, 
2012 FEDERAL YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2012), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2012year-endreport.pdf. The fiscal year for 
bankruptcy filings ends March 20, 2013. The fiscal year for civil filings ends September 30, 2012. 
Sums for both forms of filing assume that each filer paid the filing fee and that no fee waivers were 
granted.  
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195 Federal criminal, civil, and bankruptcy filing data come from ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2010 tbls.C-1, D-1 & 
F (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/Federal 
JudicialCaseloadStatistics2010.aspx. Data on state filings come from the Court Statistics Project, 
Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, State Court Caseload Statistics: Civil and Criminal—National Caseloads 2010, 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/StateCourtCaseloadStatistics.aspx (last visited May 12, 
2014). The number of state filings is an estimate, as states do not uniformly report data on all 
categories; further, this number does not include juvenile, domestic, or traffic cases that are in the 
state court filing data.  
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Figure 17: Growth Rate of State and Federal Court Filings: 1975–2013196 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To summarize, efforts to slow the rate of filings through the Long Range 
Plan’s recommendations, rule revisions, the Court’s construction of the 
FAA, and much else have sent many litigants away from the federal courts. 
But slowing filing rates have not been accompanied by a growth in trial 
rates nor significant new budgetary investments by Congress in the courts. 
Further, while the Long Range Plan discussed preserving the federal courts 
as “forums where the weak and the few have recognized rights that the 
strong and the many must regard,”197 more consumers, employees, and their 
opponents are being sent (through the FAA doctrine and other developments) 
 
196 The information presented regarding federal filings comes from multiple sources. Data 
for 1975–1998 are from Shughart and Karahan, supra note 184. Data for 1999–2010 are from 
Annual Reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. See FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., HISTORICAL CASELOADS, supra note 184. Federal caseload numbers do not 
include bankruptcy filings. State filing data for the years 1988–2010 were provided by the National 
Center for State Courts in two spreadsheets (on file with author). As explained in note 195, supra, 
not all states report data in all categories, and the state figures detailed here do not include 
juvenile, domestic, or traffic cases. Growth rates in state filings during 1975–1988 are not included 
because comparable data are not available for that period. State filing data after 2010 were not 
available.  
197 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 65, at 20. 
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to the private sector for resolution of disputes. The federal courts are 
increasingly venues for the bankrupt, who join a stream of criminal defendants. 
Stephen Yeazell entitled an article “Getting What We Asked For, Get-
ting What We Paid For, and Not Liking What We Got.”198 Some will “like” 
what “we” are getting, but below, I explain why “we,” the public, ought to 
object to what is being lost.  
VII.  FORWARD TO THE FUTURE: THE DECLINE OF DEMOCRATIC 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR DEBATING NORMS 
The thoughtful trial judge who identified himself as part of an “endan-
gered species”199 argued that, while the practices had changed, the judicial 
“mission” had not; judges continued “to interpret and clarify laws, adjudi-
cate and protect rights, maintain fair processes, and punish” even as “the 
method” of doing so had been altered.200 But even if judges do so, the 
public dimensions of their work are diminishing. Public adjudicatory 
procedures make important contributions to functioning democracies, as the 
past seventy-five years of interactions between equality norms and the 1938 
Federal Rules exemplify. In closing, I outline some of what is lost as pro-
cesses are privatized. 
To do so, I draw on Jeremy Bentham who, writing in 1812, explained the 
value of what he termed “publicity,”201 a practice he wholly admired. 
“Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison with 
publicity, all other checks are of small account.”202 Bentham’s claims are 
echoed regularly in case law on rights of access to courts. Calling courts a 
“theatre of justice,”203 Bentham believed that courts sparked communication 
between citizen and the state; it would be “natural” for judges to adopt “the 
habit of giving reasons from the bench.”204 The court was also therefore a 
“school,” teaching the public about the rules of law.205 
Further, Bentham saw public processes as the means by which the public 
could critique both judges and the law. Bentham urged that ordinary 
 
198 Stephen C. Yeazell, Getting What We Asked For, Getting What We Paid For, and Not Liking 
What We Got: The Vanishing Civil Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 943 (2004). 
199 Hornby, supra note 92, at 462. 
200 Id. at 467-68. 
201 See JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827), reprinted in 6 
THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 351 (John Bowring ed., 1843).  
202 Id. at 355. 
203 Id. at 354. 
204 Id. at 357. 
205 Id. at 355. 
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spectators, or “auditors,”206 be permitted to take notes that could be distrib-
uted widely. These minutes could serve as insurance for the good judge and 
as a corrective against misrepresentations made by “an unrighteous judge”: 
“Publicity is the very soul of justice. . . . It keeps the judge himself, while 
trying, under trial.”207 
Bentham’s critique is in many respects remarkably modern, as he argued 
for simplified procedures and holistic treatment of problems. Further, 
Bentham worried about costs, and he wanted fast, oral proceedings, with 
judges available around the clock. Moreover, Bentham opposed filing fees as 
“a tax upon distress,”208 and he proposed subsidies for litigation through an 
“Equal Justice Fund” that would pay the transportation and lodging costs 
for litigants.209  
In addition to Bentham’s focus on publicity as enhancing accuracy, edu-
cation, and discipline, today’s courts serve another function—as a site of 
democratic practices. Courts model the democratic precepts of equal treat-
ment, demonstrate that the state itself is subject to democratic constraints, 
and facilitate democratic revisions of governing norms. Adjudication is an 
odd moment in which individuals can oblige others to treat them as equals 
as they argue in public about their disagreements, misbehavior, wrongdoing, 
and obligations. Courts are the great leveler, as the goals of participatory 
parity and reciprocal respect require that all participants, including the 
government, act as their opponents’ equals. 
Litigation forces dialogue upon the unwilling and temporarily alters 
configurations of authority. The public facets either make good on egalitarian 
promises or prompt inquiries (such as the gender, race, and ethnic bias task 
forces of the 1980s and 1990s)210 into the failures to live up to them. Moreover, 
rights of audience divest the litigants and the government of exclusive 
control over conflicts and their resolution. The public and the immediate 
participants see that law varies by contexts, decisionmakers, litigants, and 
 
206 Id. at 356. 
207 JEREMY BENTHAM, BENTHAM’S DRAUGHT FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF JUDICIAL 
ESTABLISHMENTS, COMPARED WITH THAT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, WITH A 
COMMENTARY ON THE SAME n.d. [not dated], reprinted in 4 THE WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM 305, 316 ( J ohn Bowring ed., 1843). 
208 JEREMY BENTHAM, A PROTEST AGAINST LAW-TAXES, SHOWING THE PECULIAR 
MISCHIEVOUSNESS OF ALL SUCH IMPOSITIONS AS ADD TO THE EXPENSE OF APPEAL TO 
JUSTICE (1793), reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 573, 582 (John Bowring ed., 
1843).  
209 See FREDERICK ROSEN, JEREMY BENTHAM AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: 
A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CODE 153-54 (1983). 
210 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Asking About Gender in Courts, 21 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & 
SOC’Y 952 (1996). 
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facts. Through democratic iterations—the backs-and-forths of courts, 
legislatures, and the public—norms can be reconfigured.  
As in other democratic processes, such as majoritarian voting, the outputs 
are widely varied. Public awareness can generate new rights, such as free-
dom from domestic violence, and new limitations, such as caps on monetary 
damages for malpractice. Thus, unlike Bentham, I do not presume that the 
public debate will necessarily produce just (in utilitarian terms or other-
wise) results or “an improvement in the quality of opinions held by the 
people.”211  
Yet court-based publicity does enable debate about norms, and the ascent 
of participatory rights in public judicial processes prompted significant 
investments in the courts. The shift towards ADR represents the decline of 
adjudication, and, with it, the role of the federal courts. Bentham’s reforms 
to curb what he saw as the problems generated by “Judge & Co.” were to 
require simpler, more public, and better-funded procedures. The current 
solutions privatize procedures, and those put at risk are not only litigants or 
members of the potential audience but the judges themselves.  
Adjudication has a special purchase on the public fisc because of its dis-
tinctive character as a specific kind of social ordering. In contrast, through 
case management, judicial efforts at settlement, and mandatory ADR in or 
through courts; through devolution to administrative agencies; and through 
enforcement of waivers of rights to court, the framework of “due process 
procedure,” with its independent judges and open courts, is replaced by 
what can fairly be called “contract procedure.”212 As judges press to alter 
juridical modes and reconfigure courts as but one of many places for dispute 
resolution, as judges embrace management and settlement, and as judges 
stop working before the public eye, judges lose the argument for their 
independence and for expansive public subsidies.  
 In 1988, on the fiftieth anniversary of the Federal Rules, John Frank 
explained that “[d]ispute settling is a social function of government . . . of 
a piece with delivering the mail, controlling traffic, or providing school 
lunches.”213 There are “old and new government social services. Dispute 
 
211 See PHILIP SCHOFIELD, UTILITY AND DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT 
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 267 (2009). 
212 See generally Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 129. 
213 See John P. Frank, The Rules of Civil Procedure—Agenda for Reform, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
1883, 1883 (1989).  
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settling is very nearly the oldest . . . .”214 But democratic dispute resolution 
is novel, and as detailed here, fragile.  
 
214 Id.  
